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Comments
The Rhode Island Student Loan Bill of
Rights Act¾Far More Than “An
Aspirational Document”
Edward A. Gencarelli, Jr.*
INTRODUCTION

In order to attend the University of Connecticut and
Columbia University between 1988 and 2005, Miguel Rivera
incurred over $120,000 in federal student loan debt.1 In 2007,
shortly after completing his education, Rivera pooled his many
individual student loans together into two consolidated federal
loans to streamline his repayment, a move that resulted in Navient
Solutions becoming Rivera’s student loan servicer.2 As a result of
the 2008 financial crisis and the ensuing recession, Rivera
struggled to find and retain meaningful employment and found
himself on increasingly tenuous economic footing.3 Fortunately,

* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Roger Williams University School of Law,
2022; Janet D. Steiger Fellow, Rhode Island Office of the Attorney General,
2020. I would like to thank Professor Carl T. Bogus for his invaluable guidance
and support; David Marzilli for his insight and encouragement to write this
Comment; and my family, friends, and editors for their support and kindness
throughout the writing process. I would also like to stress that the views expressed and conclusions reached in this Comment are mine alone.
1. See Rivera v. Navient Sols., L.L.C., No. 20-cv-1284 (LJL), 2020 WL
4895698, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2020).
2. See id.
3. See id. at *3–5.
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however, the terms of his loan agreement with Navient allowed
Rivera to forbear loan payments multiple times until 2013.4 Yet,
Rivera’s economic struggles persisted and he ultimately applied for
an Income-Based Repayment plan that, at certain times from 2015
through 2019, reduced his monthly payment to zero dollars.5
Troublingly, from July 2015 until October 2019—and even
when Rivera qualified for a zero-dollar monthly payment—Navient
erroneously overcharged Rivera by $23.39 each month, an amount
reflecting a single late fee that Rivera incurred in April of 2015.6
Fearing that he would lose his eligibility for his reduced monthly
payment plan if he failed to pay the extra $23.39 each month,
Rivera, who had suffered a debilitating compound fracture to his
ankle, “traveled by wheelchair, then by walker, and then by cane,
to deposit the $23.39 to his bank account to pay Navient.”7
However, instead of properly directing Rivera’s overpayment
toward the recurring late fee, Navient inappropriately treated the
overpayment as a prepayment of future interest on Rivera’s loans,
allowing the fictitious late fee to be recharged each month and
resulting in Rivera overpaying Navient by a startling $1,099.33.8
Rivera is just one of many student loan borrowers who have
experienced frustration with—and mistreatment at the hands of—
federal student loan servicing companies in recent years.9 Many of
these companies, with whom the United States Department of
Education (ED) contracts to service its massive student loan
portfolio, have developed a reputation for employing deceptive or
otherwise unfair practices toward the borrowers they serve.10
Aside from charging erroneous late fees,11 some servicers have

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

See id. at *3.
See id. at *4.
See id.
Id. at *4–5.
Id.
See, e.g., CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CFPB
PRIVATE EDUCATION LOAN OMBUDSMAN 10 (2020), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_annual-report_private-education-loan-ombudsman_2020.pdf [perma.cc/4ZCA-X64N] [hereinafter CFPB REPORT].
10. See David S. Rubenstein, The Student Loan Crisis Through an Administrative Federalism Lens, 44 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 8, 8 (2019).
11. See Rivera, 2020 WL 4895698, at *4.
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inappropriately directed borrowers into deferments12 or
forbearances13 on their loans,14 and most have made loan
forgiveness effectively impossible for borrowers to achieve.15 These
practices, coupled with ED’s failure to properly police them, present
a growing risk of harm to student loan borrowers throughout the
United States.
In response to that risk, some of the more progressive states
and jurisdictions have codified certain rights for all student loan
borrowers in their interactions with federal student loan
servicers.16 In 2019, Rhode Island joined those states by enacting

12. A deferment is a temporary postponement of student loan payments
during which interest generally does not accrue on certain types of federal
loans. Glossary: Deferment, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., https://studentaid.gov/helpcenter/answers/topic/glossary/article/deferment
[https://perma.cc/RK3SDHDZ] (last visited May 18, 2021).
13. A forbearance is a temporary postponement of, or reduction to, scheduled student loan payments, during which interest does accrue on the affected
loans and is typically capitalized—that is, added to the principal balance of the
affected loans—at the end of the forbearance period. Glossary: Forbearance,
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., https://studentaid.gov/help-center/answers/topic/glossary/article/forbearance [perma.cc/PF8X-YACN] (last visited May 18, 2021).
Though forbearances can be helpful for many borrowers with short-term cash
flow issues, the capitalization of the interest that accrues during the forbearance period can result in higher monthly payments for the borrower after the
forbearance expires and can prolong the amount of time it takes for the borrower to repay the loans or qualify for many of ED’s student loan forgiveness
programs. See id.
14. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Navient Corp., 967 F.3d 273, 280–81 (3d Cir.
2020); Nelson v. Great Lakes Educ. Loan Servs., Inc., 928 F.3d 639, 644 (7th
Cir. 2019). While deferments or forbearances can help borrowers in certain
circumstances, a blanket policy that steers borrowers into forbearances instead
of income-based repayment plans, where the latter would be more appropriate,
generally profits the servicers—and, by extension, the federal government—at
the borrowers’ expense. See Nelson, 928 F.3d at 644 (improper direction into
forbearance and deferment by a servicer operating off of a script); Navient, 967
F.3d at 280–81 (steering borrowers into forbearance because it was administratively easier for Navient to do so).
15. See, e.g., Andrew Keshner, Education Department explains why only
1% of people who applied for public-loan forgiveness were accepted,
MARKETWATCH
(Sept.
22,
2019,
9:27
AM),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/education-dept-admits-much-criticized-loan-forgivenessprogram-has-obstacles-for-borrowers-2019-09-20 [perma.cc/AF4G-BVYA].
16. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 36a-846–859 (West, Westlaw
through 2021 Reg. Sess.); D.C. CODE §§ 31-106.01–106.03 (2020); 110 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 992/1-1–99-99 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 101-651).
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the Rhode Island Student Loan Bill of Rights Act (SLBORA).17
Among its many borrower protection measures, SLBORA requires
student loan servicers to register with the Rhode Island
Department of Business Regulation (DBR), make certain annual
disclosures to the DBR related to their core business practices, and
refrain from engaging in certain prohibited student loan
behaviors.18 In addition, SLBORA authorizes the Rhode Island
Attorney General to enforce violations of the statute as unfair or
deceptive acts or practices under the state’s more traditional
consumer protection statute.19
Although the Attorney General has yet to bring a case
against a servicer under SLBORA, servicers elsewhere have
challenged other states’ statutes on constitutional preemption
grounds, invoking ED’s argument that such state laws conflict with
or otherwise obstruct ED’s regulation of the federal student loan
program.20 This argument has succeeded in some jurisdictions and
in certain contexts and has failed in others.21 But, if the servicers
were to bring such a challenge to Rhode Island next, how would
SLBORA fare?
Despite challenges to similar statutes in other states, the
majority of SLBORA should survive a servicer’s preemption
challenge because the statute does not involve a servicer licensing
scheme, its reporting requirements derive from constitutional
authority, and its prohibited conduct provisions strive to protect
Rhode Island consumers using the state’s traditional police powers.
Part I of this Comment will provide some relevant background
surrounding the origins of SLBORA and survey the landscape of
state laws regulating student loan servicer conduct. Part II will
detail how the federal courts have evaluated two of SLBORA’s outof-state counterparts thus far, and extract from those evaluations
17. See 19 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 19-33-1 to -16 (2020).
18. See generally id.
19. See id. § 19-33-13 (authorizing the Attorney General to police SLBORA
violations using the Rhode Island Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 6 R.I. GEN.
LAWS §§ 6-13.1-1 to -30 (2020)).
20. See generally Federal Preemption and State Regulation of the Department of Education’s Federal Student Loan Programs and Federal Student
Loan Servicers, 83 Fed. Reg. 10,619, 10,619 (Mar. 12, 2018).
21. See Student Loan Servicing All. v. District of Columbia, 351 F. Supp.
3d 26, 75–76 (D.D.C. 2018) (preempted in part); Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance
Agency v. Perez, 457 F. Supp. 3d 112, 133–34 (D. Conn. 2020) (preempted).
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the key tests that courts would likely apply to a preemption
challenge to SLBORA. Part III will then utilize the available case
law to distinguish SLBORA’s operative components from those
statutes found to be preempted in other jurisdictions while also
detailing certain provisions within SLBORA that might not fare as
well if subjected to a preemption challenge.
I.

STUDENT LOANS¾SERVICER MISCONDUCT AND THE STATES’
RESPONSE

The federal government’s massive student loan system is a
complex beast and a proper discussion of its many intricacies lies
far beyond the scope of this Comment. Thus, Part I of this
Comment will describe the impetus for states to enact their own
student loan borrower protection statutes; briefly discuss three
state-level student loan borrower protection statutes, including
SLBORA; and introduce the grounds upon which a constitutional
challenge to SLBORA could foreseeably arise.
A. Student Loans in Brief¾Size and Scope
As a result of expansive growth in its federal student loan
portfolio over the past decade, ED has become a behemoth, trilliondollar lending institution.22 As of February 2020, the total size of
ED’s student loan portfolio reached a staggering $1.67 trillion.23
Just two years earlier, ED’s student loan portfolio accounted for
nearly half of the federal government’s assets.24
ED has offered myriad student loan types over the years, and
the composition of its student loan portfolio is rather complex.25
Since 2010, the federal government has originated the vast
majority of new federal student loans under its Federal Direct Loan
Program (FDLP), through which student loan borrowers take out

22. See, e.g., Samantha L. Bailey & Christopher J. Ryan, Jr., The Next “Big
Short”: COVID-19, Student Loan Discharge in Bankruptcy, and the SLABS
Market, 73 SMU L. REV. 809, 814–15 (2020).
23. See Zack Friedman, Student Loan Debt Statistics in 2020: A Record
$1.6
Trillion,
FORBES
(Feb.
3,
2020,
6:51
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/zackfriedman/2020/02/03/student-loan-debt-statistics/?sh=47286963281f [perma.cc/6YH5-Y5DU].
24. See Student Loan Servicing All., 351 F. Supp. 3d at 39.
25. See id. at 38.
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loans from ED directly.26 Prior to 2010, the Higher Education Act
also permitted the federal government to reinsure loans that
private lenders originated under the Federal Family Education
Loan Program (FFELP).27 In addition, one of Congress’s many
statutory responses to the 2008 financial crisis allowed ED to
purchase FFELP loans from private lenders within a short window,
which effectively made the federal government the lender of
whichever loans ED purchased.28 Those FFELP loans that the
federal government did not purchase during its statutory window
remain held by private lenders and reinsured by the federal
government.29
So, for the purposes of this analysis and for the sake of
simplicity, federal student loans can be consolidated into three
separate categories: (1) FDLP Loans, which the government owns
outright; (2) the FFELP loans that the government purchased from
private lenders in response to the financial crisis (GovernmentOwned FFELP Loans); and (3) the original FFELP loans, which
remain owned by private lenders and reinsured by the federal
government (Commercial FFELP Loans).30 For context, as of
February 2020, student loan borrowers owed about $1.2 trillion in
FDLP Loans, and about $261.6 billion in FFELP Loans.31
B. Student Loan Servicers and Imprudent Loan Management
A massive service industry has blossomed to assist the federal
government with the management of its complex loan portfolio.
Known as student loan servicers, these commercial entities
essentially serve as intermediaries between ED and federal student
loan borrowers.32 Servicers assist borrowers with the repayment of
their loans, provide guidance or information with respect to the
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. Id. (discussing the Ensuring Continued Access to Student Loans Act of
2008, Pub. L. 110-227, 122 Stat. 740)). ED purchased about $94 million worth
of FFELP loans under this program—a mere drop in the bucket compared to
the overall FFELP program, which totals about $261.6 billion. Id.; see also
Friedman, supra note 23 (detailing federal student loan balances in 2020).
29. Student Loan Servicing All., 351 F. Supp. 3d at 38.
30. Id.
31. See Friedman, supra note 23.
32. Student Loan Servicing All., 351 F. Supp. 3d at 39.
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various repayment options available, and direct borrowers into
deferments or forbearances when their individual situations
demand.33
The Higher Education Act outlines a series of procedures to
which student loan servicers must adhere and standards they must
meet when servicing federal student loans.34
The Higher
Education Act also allows ED to contract directly with student loan
servicers to manage its FDLP and Government-Owned FFELP
Loans.35 Although the Higher Education Act requires ED to adhere
to certain standards when selecting the servicers with whom it
wishes to contract,36 the law also gives ED wide leeway to set the
terms of those contracts.37
Further, the Higher Education Act authorizes ED to
promulgate regulations establishing “minimum standards with
respect to sound [servicer] management and accountability,”
particularly, though not exclusively, with respect to servicers with
whom private lenders contract to service Commercial FFELP
Loans.38 ED has used this regulatory authority to set financial and
administrative standards for servicers who wish to contract with
ED or a private lender to service federal student loans.39 ED also
manages the Office of Federal Student Aid, which contains the
Ombudsman Group that is dedicated to resolving borrower disputes
and complaints related to the servicing of its loans.40 Notably, the
Higher Education Act does not provide a private cause of action
against a servicer for harmful or deceptive conduct.41
Naturally, such a large loan portfolio and network of servicers
presents the government with a slew of operational efficiency
challenges. Despite ED’s regulatory scheme, student loan servicers
have become notorious for imprudent management of federal

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See 20 U.S.C. § 1087f (2018).
See Student Loan Servicing All., 351 F. Supp. 3d at 39.
See id. at 39 & n.6 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1082(A)(1)).
See id. at 39.
Id. at 39–40.
Id. at 40 & n.8.
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student loans.42 In fact, between September 1, 2019, and August
31, 2020, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau fielded nearly
7,000 borrower complaints related to student loans generally.43
Nearly seventy percent of complaints filed after March 1, 2020,
pertained to issues “dealing with [a borrower’s] lender or servicer”44
while the lion’s share throughout the reporting period involved
receiving “bad information about [a] loan” or “[t]rouble with how
payments are being handled [by a servicer].”45
Some aggrieved borrowers have taken their complaints to the
courts as well. According to recent court filings, some servicers
have developed internal programs to purposefully steer borrowers
otherwise eligible for income-based repayment plans into
This practice often leads to
forbearances or deferments.46
borrowers paying more for their loans over a longer period of time,
resulting in larger overall profits for the servicers while often
delaying or otherwise complicating borrowers’ eligibility for ED’s
various student loan forgiveness programs.47 Servicers have also
misapplied or made affirmative misrepresentations about
borrowers’ loan payments, often leading folks already on the brink
of economic turmoil to endure further hardship while attempting to
repay their loans.48
Even outside of the courtroom, the servicers’ dubious practices
have resulted in their popular reputation for prolonging the amount
of time it takes for borrowers to repay their debts and for helping
ED make loan forgiveness nearly impossible for eligible borrowers

42. See Rubenstein, supra note 10, at 8.
43. See CFPB REPORT, supra note 9, at 10. In addition to the 7,000 complaints that the CFPB fielded, ED directly receives approximately 30,000 student loan complaints on an annual basis. Id. at 10 n.6.
44. See id. at 15.
45. See id. at 16. The reporting period spanned from September 1, 2019,
through August 31, 2020. Id.
46. See Nelson v. Great Lakes Educ. Loan Servs., Inc., 928 F.3d 639, 644
(7th Cir. 2019) (improper direction into forbearance and deferment by a servicer operating off of a script).
47. See id.; see also Pennsylvania v. Navient Corp., 967 F.3d 273, 280–81
(3d Cir. 2020) (discussing forbearance steering and its impact on borrower eligibility for federal student loan forgiveness programs).
48.See Rivera v. Navient Sols., LLC, No. 20-cv-1284 (LJL), 2020 WL 4895698,
at *3–5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2020) (affirmative misrepresentations).
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to achieve.49 Adding to the frustration, the federal government has
failed to effectively police the errant behaviors of student loan
servicers under the Trump administration,50 despite having the
ability to do so under various federal consumer protection
statutes.51 This failure has prompted some jurisdictions to enact
so-called student loan bill of rights statutes to expand their general
consumer protection powers.
C. Surveying the State Law Landscape
At least facially, state statutes governing federal student loan
servicer conduct serve to supplement the federal consumer
protection laws and ED’s servicer regulations.52 Connecticut and
the District of Columbia both enacted legislation of this type
recently, and a brief survey of their approaches will provide a useful
glimpse into state servicer regulations outside of Rhode Island.
1.

Borrower Protections in D.C. and Connecticut

In 2016, the District of Columbia enacted a law seeking to
protect and better educate its student loan borrowers in their
interactions with student loan servicers.53 Interestingly, the D.C.
law created the district’s own Ombudsman, a position responsible
for processing and attempting to resolve borrower complaints
surrounding student loans.54 The Ombudsman also works to
educate borrowers on their rights and responsibilities under the
terms of their federal student loans.55

49. See Keshner, supra note 15 (noting that, as of 2018, ED rejected a staggering 99% of borrowers who applied for student loan forgiveness under its
Public Service Loan Forgiveness Program).
50. See, e.g., Andrew Kreighbaum, Warren to DeVos: Drop Navient’s Contract, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Oct. 17, 2019), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/10/17/warren-calls-trump-administration-fire-loan-servicer-navient [perma.cc/U49T-VN86]
51. See generally Jeffrey P. Naimon, Sasha Leonhardt & Sarah B. Meehan,
School of Hard Knocks: Federal Student Loan Servicing and the Looming Federal Student Loan Crisis, 72 ADMIN. L. REV. 259, 286–90 (2020).
52. See id. at 290.
53. See D.C. CODE §§ 31-106.01–106.03 (2020).
54. Id. § 31-106.01(c).
55. See id. § 31-106.01(c)(4).

708 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:699
Most critically, the D.C. law requires federal student loan
servicers to obtain a license from the Department of Insurance,
Securities, and Banking (DISB) prior to servicing the loans of D.C.
residents.56 In order to qualify for a license, the servicer must
submit an application that DISB promulgates, three years of
audited financial statements, and “[a]ny other information [DISB]
considers necessary and appropriate.”57 Although the statute
compels DISB to issue a license if the application meets all
necessary requirements, DISB retains discretion to revoke a license
after notice and a hearing if a servicer engages in any of a series of
practices that DISB prohibits under the D.C. law or its
implementing regulations.58
Connecticut enacted similar student loan borrower protection
Much like its D.C. counterpart, the
legislation in 2015.59
Connecticut statute requires student loan servicers to obtain a
license through its Department of Banking (DOB).60 However, the
process of obtaining a license in Connecticut is a bit more involved
than in D.C., and the DOB wields more statutory power than its
counterpart in D.C.61 For example, after a servicer completes the
requisite application, the DOB may issue a license only after
“investigat[ing] the [servicer’s] financial condition and
responsibility, financial and business experience, [and] character
and general fitness” for business in Connecticut.62 The statute also
56. Id. § 31-106.02(a).
57. Id. § 31-106.02(c)(1); see also D.C. CODE MUN. REGS. tit. 26-C3002 (LexisNexis through D.C. Reg., Vol. 68, Issue 7) (outlining required application
components).
58. D.C. CODE § 31-106.02(h)(1).
59. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 36a-846–859 (West, Westlaw through
2021 Reg. Sess.).
60. Id. § 36a-847(a)(1).
61. Compare id. § 36a-847, with D.C. CODE § 31-106.02 (2020). However,
the D.C. law empowers DISB to promulgate rules to further the D.C. law’s implementation, and DISB has used that authority to effectively grant itself a
review power similar to that wielded by its Connecticut counterpart. D.C.
CODE § 31-106.03 (2020); Student Loan Servicing All. v. District of Columbia,
351 F. Supp. 3d 26, 62 (D.D.C. 2018) (discussing the fitness assessment built
into DISB’s application requirements); see also D.C. CODE MUN. REGS. tit. 26C3002.2(c) (LexisNexis through D.C. Reg., Vol. 68, No. 2) (outlining application
components giving DISB fitness assessment authority).
62. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36a-847(c) (West, Westlaw through 2021 Reg.
Sess.).
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requires licensees to maintain detailed records of each transaction
with Connecticut borrowers, and to disclose those records to the
DOB on demand63
In keeping with the consumer protection spirit of the law,
Connecticut’s statute delineates a series of prohibited student loan
servicer activities, including the utilization of any unfair or
deceptive practice in the servicing of student loans and the knowing
misapplication or reckless application of borrower’s loan
payments.64 Should a student loan servicer engage in any such
activity, the statute authorizes the DOB to conduct wide-ranging
investigations of the servicer65 and permits the DOB to suspend or
revoke an errant servicer’s license.66
D. Rhode Island’s Approach¾The Student Loan Bill of Rights
Act
In 2019, Rhode Island joined D.C. and Connecticut by passing
legislation to protect student loan borrowers from the errant
conduct of federal student loan servicers.67 Spearheaded by
Attorney General Peter F. Neronha, the Rhode Island General
Assembly enacted SLBORA to secure important borrower rights
and protections for “[m]ore than 130,000 Rhode Islanders [who] owe
more than $4.5 billion in student loan debt.”68
Pursuant to SLBORA, all student loan servicers wishing to do
business with Rhode Island borrowers must register with the DBR
annually69 and pay an annual registration fee.70 Importantly,
unlike its counterparts in Connecticut and D.C., SLBORA does not
require a servicer to obtain a license from the DBR to operate within

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. § 36a-849.
Id. § 36a-850.
Id. § 36a-851.
Id. § 36a-852.
See PETER F. NERONHA, R.I. ATT’Y GEN., STUDENT LOAN BORROWER
RELIEF DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC: THE CARES ACT AND OTHER
ASSISTANCE 1 (May 19, 2020), http://riag.ri.gov/documents/Guidance%20
for%20Student%20Loan%20Borrowers%20on%20CARES%20Act.pdf
[perma.cc/V375-Q8RY].
68. See id.
69. 19 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-33-4(g) (2020) (emphasis added).
70. Id. § 19-33-4(c)(2).
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the state.71 As will become apparent later, this distinction will
ultimately prove critical to the statute’s efficacy.72
In addition to the registration requirement, SLBORA requires
servicers to maintain “complete records of each student education
loan transaction, including recordings of communications with
borrowers,” and to make those records available to the state upon
request and within five days of such a request.73 Further, each
servicer must file an annual report with the DBR, “giving any
relevant information that [the DBR] may reasonably require
concerning the business and operations [of the servicer] during the
preceding calendar year.”74
To properly protect borrowers from errant servicer conduct,
SLBORA outlines a series of practices that all servicers must
employ in their interactions with Rhode Island borrowers75 and
expressly prohibits certain types of servicer conduct.76 Should it
appear that a servicer is in breach of SLBORA, the statute offers
three main enforcement measures. First, the DBR may conduct an
examination of any person or entity registered as a servicer
pursuant to SLBORA at any time.77 Second, SLBORA authorizes
the Rhode Island Attorney General to police violations of the
statute as unfair or deceptive acts under the Rhode Island
Deceptive Trade Practices Act.78 Lastly, unlike the federal Higher
71. Compare id. § 19-33-4, with CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36a-847 (West,
Westlaw through 2021 Reg. Sess.) and D.C. CODE § 31-106.02 (2020).
72. See discussion infra Section III.A.
73. 19 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-33-6 (2020).
74. Id. § 19-33-7.
75. See id. § 19-33-8.
76. See id. § 19-33-12. For example, SLBORA prohibits servicers from employing “any scheme, device, or artifice to defraud or mislead student loan borrowers.” Id. § 19-33-12(1). For a disturbing example of a servicer employing
just such a scheme, see Pennsylvania v. Navient Corp., 967 F.3d 273, 280–81
(3d Cir. 2020).
77. 19 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 19-33-9(a), -9(c).
78. Id. § 19-33-13. The legislature’s express authorization for the Attorney
General to use the Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA) within section 19-3313 stems from a decades-old Rhode Island Supreme Court decision, State v.
Piedmont Funding Corp., which held that individuals or businesses subject to
regulation by state or federal agencies were exempt from DTPA enforcement
actions—irrespective of whether the conduct triggering that enforcement action was permitted under those regulations or not. See 382 A.2d 819, 822 (R.I.
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Education Act, SLBORA provides borrowers with a private right of
action against a servicer who violates the statute.79
E. Foreseeable Harm to the Statute¾Why Constitutionality is
Questionable
To the untrained eye, SLBORA and its out-of-state
counterparts may seem like a proverbial slam dunk for each state’s
respective student loan borrowers.
However, the federal
government views this category of statutes in a far different light.
In March of 2018, ED issued an informal notice directly challenging
the viability of state regulation of federal student loan servicer
conduct.80 In that notice, ED took the position that state student
loan servicer regulations like SLBORA interfere with ED’s uniform

1978); see also Lynch v. Conley, 853 A.2d 1212, 1215 (R.I. 2004) (reaffirming
Piedmont). As Piedmont and its progeny would likely allow the heavily regulated student loan servicers to claim exemption from any DTPA enforcement
action, the express authorization for the Attorney General to use the DTPA
within SLBORA apparently strives to prevent the servicers from derivatively
claiming exemption from a SLBORA enforcement action. However, a servicer
could still foreseeably argue that section 19-33-13 of SLBORA does nothing
more than expressly equip the Attorney General with a broken weapon in light
of the Piedmont decision and the DTPA’s exemption provision. Stated differently, if a gun has a broken trigger assembly, simply authorizing someone to
fire it—without making any repairs to it—will not make the gun functional. A
proper evaluation of both of these arguments, however, lies outside the scope
of this Comment.
79. 19 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-33-14 (2020); see also Student Loan Servicing
All. v. District of Columbia, 351 F. Supp. 3d 26, 40–41 (D.D.C. 2018) (noting no
private right of action for federal student loan borrowers under the Higher Education Act).
80. See Federal Preemption and State Regulation of the Department of
Education’s Federal Student Loan Programs and Federal Student Loan Servicers, 83 Fed. Reg. 10,619, 10,619 (Mar. 12, 2018). This Trump-era interpretation was still in place as of early April 2021, but eleven state financial regulators—including the Rhode Island Department of Business Regulation—
recently called on the Biden administration to rescind it, calling the regulation
“legally dubious.” Aarthi Swaminathan, “Misguided and Unsound”: States
Call on New Education Secretary to Stop Protecting Student Loan Servicers,
YAHOO (Mar. 9, 2021), https://www.yahoo.com/now/states-call-on-educationsecretary-to-stop-protecting-student-loan-servicers-150103632.html
[perma.cc/AVT5-LZLS]. Irrespective of whether ED’s interpretation changes,
however, case law that lends considerable credence to the Trump-era interpretation and its underlying arguments already exists. See discussion infra Part
II.
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administration of the federal student loan program and are
therefore preempted.81
ED used three main points to make this argument. Foremost,
ED argued that state statutes mandating that servicers obtain a
license to operate are invalid because they attempt to second-guess
a servicer’s viability to contract with the federal government.82 This
argument attacks the licensing scheme that lies at the core of many
state statutes in this area. Second, ED argued that the Higher
Education Act expressly preempts state statutes requiring
servicers to make disclosures not required by federal law, which
attempts to dismantle the various reporting and disclosure
requirements embedded within the relevant state statutes.83 And
finally, ED argued that existing federal borrower protections, such
as the Federal Student Aid Ombudsman Group and ED’s servicer
contracting standards, adequately protect federal student loan
borrowers from errant servicer conduct.84 According to ED, these
protections reduce state-level borrower protections to nothing more
than duplicative obstacles to the uniformity that Congress intended
federal regulations to construct under the Higher Education Act.85
After ED issued its informal notice, student loan servicers
quickly began challenging state student loan servicer regulations,
arguing that such statutes are unconstitutional and preempted by
the federal government’s regulation of the space in lockstep with
ED’s guidance. In fact, servicers successfully challenged SLBORA’s
counterparts in both D.C. and Connecticut on preemption
grounds.86 So, if a federal student loan servicer were to challenge
SLBORA on similar grounds, how would SLBORA fare?
81. Federal Preemption and State Regulation of the Department of Education’s Federal Student Loan Programs and Federal Student Loan Servicers,
83 Fed. Reg. at 10,619–20.
82. Id. at 10,620. Specifically, ED posits that “[a] State may not enforce
licensing requirements which, though valid in the absence of federal regulation, give ‘the State’s licensing board a virtual power of review over the federal
determination’ that a person or agency is qualified and entitled to perform certain functions.” Id. (quoting Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 385 (1963)).
83. Id. at 10,621 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1098g (2018)).
84. Id. at 10,622.
85. Id. at 10,621–22.
86. See Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Perez, 457 F. Supp. 3d 112,
133–34 (D. Conn. 2020) (preempted); Student Loan Servicing All. v. District of
Columbia, 351 F. Supp. 3d 26, 76 (D.D.C. 2018) (preempted in part).
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II. EVALUATING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE STUDENT LOAN
SERVICER REGULATIONS

Determining whether SLBORA could survive a preemption
challenge is no small task. However, each of the cases that deemed
SLBORA’s out-of-state counterparts unconstitutional provides
critical insight into how the federal courts have evaluated the
question thus far. This Part will explore those cases in detail and
extract therefrom the relevant tests that the federal courts apply to
state student loan borrower protection statutes when those statutes
face preemption challenges.
A. The D.C. Case¾A Comprehensive and Persuasive Test
In 2018, the Student Loan Servicing Alliance (Servicing
Alliance), a membership organization comprised of twenty-four
federal student loan servicers who together service the vast
majority of federal student loans,87 sought a declaratory judgment
that the D.C. law, which required servicers to obtain a license
before operating within the district,88 was preempted by federal
law.89 Specifically, the Servicing Alliance challenged the D.C. law
“under all three theories of preemption—express, field, and conflict
preemption.”90 The Servicing Alliance also invoked ED’s informal
notice in support of its preemption arguments and asserted that the
notice should be treated as conclusive.91
Recognizing that his decision in the case could have significant
implications for other states with laws similar to D.C.’s, United
States District Judge Paul L. Friedman analyzed each possible
component of the Servicing Alliance’s preemption argument in
great detail, and laid out a roadmap for other courts to follow when
faced with similar arguments in the future.92 A high-level voyage
87. The various members of the Servicing Alliance “service over 95 percent
of the outstanding [FDLP] and [FFELP] student loans.” Student Loan Servicing All., 351 F. Supp. 3d at 41.
88. See D.C. CODE § 31-106.02(a) (2020); see also discussion supra Section
I.C.1.
89. See Student Loan Servicing All., 351 F. Supp. 3d at 41–42.
90. Id. at 47.
91. Id. (arguing that ED’s informal preemption notice deserved judicial
deference).
92. See id. at 36.
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through the various stops along that roadmap will prove helpful in
determining whether SLBORA has constitutional staying power.
1.

Does ED’s Guidance Deserve Judicial Deference?

Given the comprehensive and forceful argument against state
regulation of student loan servicers that ED made in its informal
notice,93 the Servicing Alliance certainly had a strong incentive to
invoke the guidance in its challenge to the D.C. law, as would any
servicer who might challenge SLBORA.94 In so doing, the Servicing
Alliance asserted that, although its argument could stand alone on
its merits, the court should defer to ED’s guidance in its analysis of
the preemption issue.95 However, as is often the case in the law, a
court cannot simply accept such assertions prima facie.96
To determine whether the statutory interpretations of a federal
agency regarding its governing statute warrant judicial deference,
courts generally apply one of two tests.97 When an agency issues a
rule that reasonably interprets an ambiguity in its governing
statute after properly navigating a rulemaking process, courts will
accord the rule Chevron deference and treat the rule as all but
conclusive on the matter it governs.98 However, where the agency
instead issues non-binding guidance—like an advisory opinion or
notice—that fails to go through the proper rulemaking process, the
court may instead accord the guidance Skidmore deference: a test
which affords the court discretion to evaluate the guidance for its
inherent persuasiveness and rule accordingly.99
Here, as ED failed to undertake the proper rulemaking
procedures when issuing its notice, the court had no trouble
deeming ED’s guidance worthy of only a Skidmore deference

93. See Federal Preemption and State Regulation of the Department of
Education’s Federal Student Loan Programs and Federal Student Loan Servicers, 83 Fed. Reg. 10,619, 10,619–22 (Mar. 12, 2018).
94. See Student Loan Servicing All., 351 F. Supp. 3d at 48.
95. Id.
96. See id. at 48–51.
97. Id. at 48–49.
98. See id. at 48 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984)).
99. See id. at 48–49 (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 138, 140
(1944)).
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analysis.100 Yet, even under that analysis, the court found ED’s
guidance far too conclusory and inconsistent with the agency’s
earlier position on the Higher Education Act’s express preemption
provision to deserve Skidmore deference.101 Thus, the combination
of ED’s conclusory statements, an unsupported deviation from its
original position on preemption, and an inherent lack of
thoroughness within its guidance reduced the informal notice to
mere opinion worthy of no judicial deference.102
At bottom, despite the facial clarity and strength of ED’s
informal notice with respect to preemption, the court held that the
Servicing Alliance—and, inferentially, prospective challengers
elsewhere—could not use ED’s notice as a trump card in an
argument against the constitutionality of state regulation of federal
student loan servicers.103 So, while any prospective challenge to
SLBORA would likely reference ED’s notice, the notice itself should
not alone decide SLBORA’s fate.
2. Express Preemption and the D.C. Law’s Disclosure
Requirements
The Servicing Alliance next argued that § 1098g of the Higher
Education Act expressly preempted the D.C. law’s servicer
reporting requirements—one of the law’s main methods for
monitoring servicers’ business practices—effectively rendering the
D.C. law bloodless.104 Section 1098g provides that “[l]oans made,
insured, or guaranteed pursuant to a program authorized by Title
IV of the [Higher Education Act] shall not be subject to any
disclosure requirements of any State law.”105 As the vast majority
of federal student loans are issued pursuant to Title IV of the
Higher Education Act, § 1098g would, according to the Servicing

100. See id. at 49.
101. See id. at 50 (citing Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 577 (2009)). Prior
to issuing its informal guidance, ED made statements “that explicitly rejected
the preemptive effect of the [Higher Education Act].” Id.
102. See id. at 50–51.
103. See id. at 49–51.
104. See id. at 51.
105. See id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1098g
(2018)).
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Alliance, prevent most federal loans from exposure to any state law
disclosure requirements.106
However, neither § 1098g nor any other component of the
Higher Education Act expressly define what the term “disclosure
requirements” means in the context of federal student loan
servicing.107 In light of scant evidence to suggest that Congress
intended the broadest possible interpretation to apply, the court
declined to interpret the statute broadly.108 Despite the Servicing
Alliance’s argument to the contrary, the court saw no reason to read
§ 1098g as preventing states from regulating all servicer
communications that exceed those required under the Higher
Education Act.109 In other words, with respect to regulating a
servicer’s disclosures to parties other than student loan borrowers,
federal law represents a floor, not a ceiling, and does not expressly
preempt the third party reporting requirements within the D.C.
law.110 Further still, the court found no reason to hold that the
short sentence contained within § 1098g reflected Congress’s clear
intent “to invalidate an entire state regulatory scheme that would
require reporting.”111
So, while § 1098g expressly preempts any state laws regulating
servicer-borrower communications with respect to federal student
loans, it does not expressly preempt state laws that regulate
communications between the student loan servicers and parties
other than federal student loan borrowers. And importantly,
§
1098g also does not alone invalidate entire state regulatory
schemes—like SLBORA—simply because they involve reporting
requirements.112 Therefore, it would seem that SLBORA can at
106. Id.
107. See id. According to the Servicing Alliance, Congress intended the
courts to interpret § 1098g’s prohibition against disclosures broadly, including
any disclosures to borrowers not contemplated by federal law and disclosures
to third-party state agencies. See id. D.C., on the other hand, argued that the
court should interpret the preemption provision narrowly to prohibit only state
regulation of servicer-to-borrower disclosures, leaving the states free to regulate servicers’ other disclosures, such as those that the D.C. law contemplated.
See id. at 51–52.
108. See id. at 53–54.
109. Id. at 54.
110. Id. at 54–55.
111. See id. at 55 (citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 487 (1996)).
112. See id.
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least safely require servicers operating within Rhode Island to
make disclosures to third party state agencies like the DBR under
Judge Friedman’s framework.113
3.

Field Preemption

The Servicing Alliance next argued that the D.C. law should be
invalidated under the doctrine of field preemption.114 Under this
doctrine, even a state law that compliments a federal law may be
invalidated when Congress clearly intends the federal law to occupy
the entire field of regulation over the relevant subject matter.115 At
the outset, the court determined that regulation of student loan
servicers represented the field of regulation relevant to its analysis,
as those servicers stood as the D.C. law’s primary “target.”116 And
while no court had opined on whether federal law occupied the
regulation of federal student loan servicers theretofore, the court
here noted that other federal courts “have consistently held that the
[Higher Education Act writ large] does not have field preemptive
effect,” reasoning that “Congress could not have intended to occupy
the field because the [Higher Education Act] requires adherence to
state law in particular provisions and explicitly preempts state law
in others.”117
After framing the issue generally, the court then evaluated the
two field preemption arguments that the Servicing Alliance
advanced. The Servicing Alliance first argued that, taken together,
the relevant federal laws and regulations “fully occupy” the field of
student loan servicer regulation such that no room exists for state
law supplementation.118 The court, however, disagreed.119 It noted
113. See id. For an analysis of SLBORA’s disclosure provisions, see discussion infra Section III.C.2.
114. See Student Loan Servicing All., 351 F. Supp. 3d at 55.
115. See id. (citing Sickle v. Torres Advanced Enter. Sols., L.L.C., 884 F.3d
388, 347 (D.C. Cir. 2018)). The requisite Congressional intent to occupy a field
“can be inferred from [either] (1) a framework of regulation . . . so pervasive
that it leaves no space for state supplementation, or [2] where the federal interest is so dominant that the existence of a federal scheme can be assumed to
preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.” Id. at 55–56 (quoting
Sickle, 884 F.3d at 347 (internal citation and quotations omitted)).
116. Id. at 56.
117. Id. (citations omitted).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 57.
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that the promulgation of extensive regulations alone cannot
evidence occupation of the entire field of servicer regulation, as such
an assumption “would be inconsistent with the federal-state
balance embodied in [the Supreme Court’s] Supremacy Clause
jurisprudence.”120 In addition, the court reiterated that Congress
intended that ED establish only “minimum standards” to which
servicers must adhere under the Higher Education Act.121 Thus, to
this court anyways, Congress left the states plenty of room to enact
supplementary regulations over student loan servicers.
Next, the Servicing Alliance argued that the federal
government’s interests in its massive student loan portfolio, and in
its rights and obligations in its contracts with the student loan
servicers, are so dominant as to preclude parallel state laws in the
field.122 Yet, notwithstanding those enormous interests, the court
found them to be outweighed by D.C.’s interest in protecting its
consumers from deceptive or otherwise unfair servicer conduct.123
Thus, despite the wide-ranging federal regulation of student
loans generally and the federal government’s trillion-dollar interest
in its student loan portfolio, a servicer’s field preemption argument
against a state law regulating servicers yielded as a matter of law
to the jurisdiction’s quasi-sovereign interest in protecting its
consumers in this case.124 For states enacting consumer protection
laws like SLBORA, this portion of the court’s holding lends
credence to the argument that state supplementation of federal
student loan servicer regulations is not only valid, but critically
important.125

120. Id. (quoting Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471
U.S. 707, 717 (1985)). As another point of inconsistency, the court called attention to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s earlier conclusion that
no comprehensive federal regulatory framework exists to govern federal student loan servicing. Id. at 58 (citing Request for Information Regarding Student Loan Servicing, 80 Fed. Reg. 29302-01, 29305 (May 21, 2015)).
121. Id. at 57 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1082(a)(1) (2018) (emphasis added)).
122. See id. at 58.
123. See id. at 58–59.
124. See id. at 59; see also Friedman, supra note 23 (describing size of the
federal government’s student loan portfolio).
125. See Pennsylvania v. Navient Corp., 967 F.3d 273, 284–87 (3d Cir. 2020)
(noting that the federal Consumer Protection Act patently allows states to
bring concurrent claims against servicers using the states’ own consumer protection laws).
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Impossibility Preemption

Next, the Servicing Alliance pulled yet another arrow out of its
seemingly capacious quiver to attack the constitutionality of the
D.C. law: the doctrine of impossibility preemption. One of the two
subcategories within the broader doctrine of conflict preemption,
impossibility preemption comes into play where federal and state
laws directly and actually conflict such that “compliance with both
. . . [laws] is a physical impossibility.”126 In this light, the Servicing
Alliance argued that compliance with the D.C. law’s reporting
requirements would force them to violate federal laws that prevent
the disclosure of borrower identification information.127
However, the court described that argument as presenting a
“false conflict.”128 Despite the Servicing Alliance’s contention, the
rules promulgated under the D.C. law contain an express
exemption encouraging servicers to provide the relevant records
“except to the extent prohibited by federal law.”129 So, even if ED
needs to review all of D.C.’s document requests for compliance with
federal law as the Servicing Alliance contended, the D.C. law does
nothing to prevent that process, and instead allows any documents
which may contain information that violates federal laws to simply
be redacted to comport with those laws.130
Thus, despite some facial overlap between the D.C. law and
other federal laws governing certain servicer reporting
requirements, the actual operation of the D.C. law’s reporting
requirements does not conflict with its federal counterparts such
that a servicer’s compliance with all of the relevant laws would be
“a physical impossibility.”131 The reporting requirements so
common within state laws of this type seem to have survived yet
another attack.

126. Student Loan Servicing All., 351 F. Supp. 3d at 59 (quoting Fla. Avocado & Lime Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963)).
127. Id. at 60.
128. Id.
129. Id. (quoting D.C. CODE MUN. REGS. tit. 26-C, § 3018.1 (LexisNexis
through D.C. Reg., Vol. 68, No. 2)).
130. Id. at 60–61.
131. Id. at 59, 61 (quoting Fla. Avocado & Lime Growers, Inc., 373 U.S. at
142–43).
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5. Obstacle Preemption¾The Servicing Alliance Lands a
Material Blow
So far, the D.C. law had withstood each of the preemptionbased challenges that the Servicing Alliance leveled against it.
ED’s conclusory guidance deserved no judicial deference;132 the
Higher Education Act’s express preemption provision applied only
to servicer-borrower communications, which the D.C. law did not
attempt to police;133 no evidence existed to suggest that Congress
intended to occupy the entire field of student loan servicer
regulation;134 and no actual conflict existed between the D.C. law
and its federal counterparts such that servicer compliance with all
relevant laws was impracticable.135 However, the Servicing
Alliance delivered a fairly crippling blow to the D.C. law with its
final—but
strongest—preemption
argument:
obstacle
preemption.136
Obstacle preemption, the second of the two conflict preemption
subcategories, comes to the fore where a state law “actually
conflicts with federal law [by standing] ‘as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives
of Congress.’”137 Because an obstacle preemption analysis requires
a more granular comparison of the D.C. law against the Higher
Education Act, the court applied the obstacle preemption doctrine
to each of the three categories of federal student loans
separately.138 As the analysis yielded the same result for both
FDLP Loans and Government-Owned FFELP Loans, those loan
categories are grouped together below.

132. See id. at 48–51 (discussing ED’s guidance).
133. See id. at 51–55 (discussing express preemption).
134. See id. at 55–59 (discussing field preemption).
135. See id. at 60–61 (discussing impossibility preemption).
136. Id. at 61.
137. Id. (quoting Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471
U.S. 707, 713 (1985) (internal citation omitted)).
138. Id. For reference, the three categories of student loans relevant to this
analysis are FDLP Loans, Government-Owned FFELP Loans, and Commercial
FFELP Loans. See id; see also discussion supra Section I.A.
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a. FDLP Loans and Government-Owned FFELP Loans¾The
D.C. Law Fails
According to the Servicing Alliance, the D.C. law’s licensing
scheme, which required servicers to obtain a license prior to
servicing student loans within the district, stood as a direct obstacle
to ED’s authority to select and contract with servicers directly for
FDLP Loans, and for the FFELP Loans which the government
purchased in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis.139 Stated
differently, by creating additional hoops for student loan servicers
to jump through in order to operate pursuant to their contracts with
the federal government, D.C’s licensing scheme “impermissibly
second-guesse[d] the federal government’s decisions to contract
with [federal student loan] servicers.”140
As noted earlier, the Higher Education Act authorizes ED to
contract directly with the servicers it plans to use to service its
FDLP Loans, and other federal law delegates similar, singular
authority to ED with respect to the servicing of Government-Owned
FFELP Loans.141 On the other hand, the D.C. law’s licensing
scheme empowers the District to grant or deny a license to operate
there only after an initial evaluation of a servicer’s financial
responsibility and character and general fitness for business within
the district.142 The D.C. licensing scheme also enables the District
to revoke a license “for a number of reasons, including if the servicer
has ‘[d]emonstrated incompetency and untrustworthiness to act as
a licensee.’”143 These elements of the licensing scheme, according
to the court, proved fatal to its constitutionality.144
By effectively second-guessing “the reliability of persons and
companies contracting with the Federal Government” to service
FDLP Loans and Government-Owned FFELP Loans, the D.C. law’s
139. Student Loan Servicing All., 351 F. Supp. 3d at 62 (FDLP Loans); id.
at 65 (Government-Owned FFELP Loans). For more information regarding
the Government’s post-2008 purchase of Commercial FFELP Loans in the
wake of the financial crisis, see id. at 38 (discussing the Ensuring Continued
Access to Student Loans Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110–227, 122 Stat. 740).
140. Id. at 62.
141. See id. at 62 (regarding FDLP Loans); id. at 65 (regarding Government-Owned FFELP Loans).
142. Id. at 62 (quoting D.C. CODE MUN. REGS. tit. 26-C § 3002.2(c)).
143. See id. (quoting D.C. CODE § 31-106.02(h)(1)(E) (2020)).
144. Student Loan Servicing All., 351 F. Supp. 3d at 63.
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licensing scheme stood as an obstacle to the federal government’s
delegation of authority to ED to enter such contracts, and failed
constitutional scrutiny as a matter of law as applied to those
loans.145 To the court, this conclusion held true even if D.C.’s
evaluation of student loan servicers resulted in the same outcome
as the federal government’s evaluation—the risk that D.C.’s
evaluation could come out differently was alone enough to render
the D.C. law’s licensing scheme preempted as it applied to FDLP
and Government-Owned FFELP Loans.146 Contrary to the rest of
Judge Friedman’s opinion, this holding dealt a particularly strong
blow to the overall efficacy of the D.C. law.147 And under Judge
Friedman’s framework, similar laws in other jurisdictions—at least
insofar as such laws involve a similar licensing scheme—likely
stand on shaky constitutional ground.148
b. Commercial FFELP Loans¾The D.C. Law Lives On (At Least
Partially)
After the court invalidated the D.C. law’s licensing scheme as
it applied to FDLP Loans and Government-Owned FFELP Loans,
one might reasonably assume that the D.C. law ought to fail in its
entirety.149 However, the court did not subject the D.C. law to the
same fate when it analyzed the law as it applied to Commercial
FFELP Loans,150 the other main component of the federal
government’s student loan portfolio.151 As noted earlier, the federal
government does not issue or otherwise assume the obligations of
Commercial FFELP Loans; it acts only as a reinsurer or guarantor
of the loans, which are instead issued and managed by private

145. See id. at 62, 65–66 (quoting Leslie Miller, Inc. v. Arkansas, 352 U.S.
187, 190 (1956)). The court relied heavily on the Leslie Miller preemption analysis to reach this conclusion. See id. at 62–66. However, as will become evident
later in this Comment, the Leslie Miller analysis did not apply to invalidate
the D.C. law as it applied to Commercial FFELP Loans—contracts to which
the federal government is not a party. See discussion infra Section II.A.5.b.
146. Student Loan Servicing All., 351 F. Supp. 3d at 63.
147. See id. at 65.
148. See id. at 63.
149. See id. at 65.
150. See id. at 67.
151. See Friedman, supra note 23.

2021]

STUDENT LOAN BORROWER PROTECTION

723

lenders.152 As a result, student loan servicers contract directly with
private lenders—and not the federal government—to service
Commercial FFELP Loans.153 This distinction—that is, that the
federal government is not a party to the contracts between the
issuers of the loans and the servicers—spares the D.C. law from the
Leslie Miller preemption analysis that proved fatal to the D.C. law
as it applied to FDLP Loans and Government-Owned FFELP
Loans.154
Yet, even after employing a more traditional obstacle
preemption analysis to the D.C. law, the court still held that the
D.C. law could be fairly applied to Commercial FFELP Loans.155
To Judge Friedman, the D.C. law’s licensing scheme—which served
only to supplement the minimum standards for servicer
qualifications that Congress intended ED to promulgate under the
Higher Education Act—could not possibly stand as an obstacle to
the effectuation of Congress’s underlying purpose for the FFELP
program.156 And, although promoting regulatory uniformity was
at least somewhat of a purpose behind the Higher Education Act,
its core purpose remained the promotion of borrower access to
federal loans.157 Thus, the D.C. law did not prevent the proper
effectuation of Congress’s core purpose for the FFELP program as
that purpose appeared from the statute’s legislative history.158
Despite this unfavorable legislative history, the Servicing
Alliance argued that the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Chae v. SLM
152. See Student Loan Servicing All., 351 F. Supp. 3d at 66. For a discussion of the Commercial FFELP Loan program generally, see discussion supra
Section I.A.
153. Student Loan Servicing All., 351 F. Supp. 3d at 66.
154. See id; see also discussion supra Section II.A.5.a.
155. Student Loan Servicing All., 351 F. Supp. 3d at 66–67, 72. This more
traditional analysis involved an evaluation of the congressional purpose underlying the relevant federal statutes or regulations, followed by a determination as to whether the state law at issue obstructed the accomplishment of that
congressional purpose. See id.
156. Id. at 69–70. According to the court, Congress’s main purpose for the
Higher Education Act with respect to the FFELP program was “to simplify the
FFELP program for student borrowers in order to further its foundational objective—improving access to higher education for all borrowers—nothing
more.” Id. at 69.
157. See id. at 67–69.
158. Id. at 71.
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Corporation still supported its assertion that the D.C. law and
federal law could not coexist in this area.159 Once again, the court
disagreed.160 Chae, the court held, dealt with state law claims that
threatened to interfere with how federal student loan servicers
conduct their work in a manner that impermissibly conflicted with
the uniform administration of the FFELP program.161 The D.C.
law and its component licensing scheme, on the other hand, were
designed to regulate who might be eligible to service the federal
student loans of the district’s residents.162 Because the latter type
of regulation does not interfere with the Higher Education Act’s
underlying purpose—that is, it does not prevent or hinder
borrowers’ access to student loans—the court held that the D.C. law
need not be preempted as it applies to Commercial FFELP
Loans.163
6.

Summarizing the D.C. Roadmap

Though incredibly long and complex, Judge Friedman’s opinion
in Student Loan Servicing Alliance provides detailed insight into
how other federal courts might evaluate similar constitutional
challenges that servicers could foreseeably bring against state
servicer regulation laws like SLBORA.164 According to the
roadmap that the opinion provides, the servicers cannot rely
entirely on ED’s informal guidance when bringing such a challenge
against a state statute.165 In addition, the Higher Education Act’s
express preemption provision applies only to servicer-borrower
communications, and scant evidence exists to support the charge
that Congress intended the numerous, relevant federal regulations
159. See id. at 70. In Chae, the Ninth Circuit found that certain state law
claims against a servicer (which went to the heart of how servicers manage
their loan portfolios) were preempted as an obstacle to the uniform administration of the FFELP program. See Chae v. SLM Corp., 593 F.3d 936, 950 (9th
Cir. 2010).
160. Student Loan Servicing All., 351 F. Supp. 3d at 70.
161. See id.
162. Id.
163. See id. at 70, 72 (explaining that the D.C. law does not interfere with
the Higher Education Act’s objective and ultimately holding that the D.C. law
is not preempted).
164. See generally id. at 46–76 (extensively analyzing each of the Servicing
Alliance’s several preemption challenges to the D.C. law).
165. See generally id. at 48–51 (discussing ED’s guidance).
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to occupy the field of servicer regulation entirely.166 Further still,
compliance with federal law, ED’s regulations, and state servicer
regulations is not necessarily physically impracticable for the
servicers.167 And most crucially, licensing schemes such as the one
that the D.C. law created cannot constitutionally be applied to a
servicer’s FDLP Loans or Government-Owned FFELP Loans, but
can be applied to a servicer’s Commercial FFELP Loans.168
At bottom, the Servicing Alliance succeeded in stripping the
D.C. law of the main tool it might use to police the errant servicing
of loans within the FDLP program, the largest component of ED’s
student loan portfolio.169 Unfortunately, the FDLP program also
happens to be the only program under which the federal
government has issued loans since 2010, and the only program
under which it plans to continues issuing new loans going
forward.170 So, Student Loan Servicing Alliance dealt a truly
crippling blow to the D.C. law, reducing the district’s noble
consumer protection law to what Judge Friedman dismissively
described as “an aspirational document.”171 But, despite the
unfavorable outcome in D.C., how have similar statutes in other
states fared when subjected to similar scrutiny? As it turns out, not
particularly well.
B. The Connecticut Case¾Another Failed Consumer Protection
Attempt
The D.C. law was not the only state (or at least non-federal)
student loan borrower protection statute to face a preemption
challenge in recent years. In 2018, the Pennsylvania Higher
Education Assistance Agency (PHEAA), another student loan
servicer who contracts with the federal government, challenged a
document request that it received pursuant to Connecticut’s

166. See generally id. at 51–55 (discussing express preemption); id. at 55–
59 (discussing field preemption).
167. See generally id. at 60–61 (discussing impossibility preemption).
168. See generally id. at 61–72 (discussing obstacle preemption).
169. See id. at 65; id. at 38 (noting that ninety percent of new student loans
are made through FDLP); see also Freidman, supra note 23 (ranking FDLP
Loans as the largest Student Loan Program).
170. See Student Loan Servicing All., 351 F. Supp. 3d at 38.
171. Id. at 52.
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student loan servicer licensing scheme.172 Using a key component
of its authority under that licensing scheme, the state sought to
examine PHEAA’s servicing practices surrounding Connecticut’s
borrowers eligible for ED’s Public Service Loan Forgiveness
Program—a program notoriously difficult for borrowers to
complete.173 When PHEAA forwarded the document request to ED
(as PHEAA was required to do under the parties’ contract), ED
instructed PHEAA not to make the requested disclosure because
doing so would violate both the parties’ contract and the Federal
Privacy Act.174 In light of ED’s instruction, and ED’s further
argument that the Connecticut licensing scheme ought to be
preempted in its entirety, PHEAA sought a declaratory judgement
as to whether the Connecticut law was, in fact, preempted by
federal law.175
Notably, PHEAA’s request of the United States District Court
for the District of Connecticut was not all that different from the
Servicing Alliance’s request in the D.C. case.176 And while the
issues to be considered were nearly identical in the two cases, the
outcome in Connecticut was even less favorable for the statute’s
constitutionality, even though the Connecticut court’s holding
applied a bit more narrowly.177 A brief analysis of the Connecticut
case should provide some additional insight into the constitutional
validity of Rhode Island’s SLBORA.

172. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Perez, 457 F. Supp. 3d 112, 115
(D. Conn. 2020). For a discussion of the Connecticut licensing scheme, see discussion supra Section I.C.1.
173. See Perez, 457 F. Supp. 3d at 118. See also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
36a-851 (West, Westlaw through 2021 Reg. Sess.) (outlining the Connecticut
Department of Banking’s servicer examination authority). On the appalling
acceptance rate of borrower applications for Public Service Loan Forgiveness
thanks, in large part, to servicer mismanagement of the program, see Keshner,
supra note 15 (noting the program’s one percent acceptance rate as of 2018).
174. Perez, 457 F. Supp. 3d at 115, 118.
175. Id. at 115.
176. See Student Loan Servicing All. v. District of Columbia, 351 F. Supp.
3d 26, 42 (D.D.C. 2018) (seeking declaratory judgment regarding constitutionality of D.C. law and its licensing scheme).
177. See Perez, 457 F. Supp. 3d at 125 (finding Connecticut’s licensing
scheme preempted as applied to FDLP Loans only).
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1. Connecticut’s Licensing Authority Fails the Conflict
Preemption Test
Although Judge Friedman performed an exhaustive analysis of
each possible preemption doctrine available to the Servicing
Alliance in the D.C. case,178 United States District Judge Michael
P. Shea only visited the doctrine of conflict preemption—
specifically, the subcategory of obstacle preemption—to determine
that Connecticut’s servicer licensing scheme was preempted.179 In
pertinent part, the obstacle preemption doctrine comes into play
where “the challenged state law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives
of Congress.”180
According to Judge Shea, the Connecticut licensing scheme
presented just such an obstacle to ED’s ability to contract with
servicers at its own discretion.181 Federal law requires ED to
thoroughly vet the servicers with whom it wishes to contract to
ensure that those servicers meet certain business responsibility
and aptitude requirements.182
In essence, the Connecticut
licensing scheme vested Connecticut with the authority to make its
own determination of a federal contractor’s suitability for
contracting with the federal government and set additional
standards that servicers must meet in order to do business within
In so doing, Connecticut’s licensing scheme
Connecticut.183
impermissibly granted the state “a virtual power of review” over
ED’s contracting decisions in such a manner as to render the
licensing scheme unconstitutional and preempted as applied to
FDLP Loans.184 As such, PHEAA did not need to comply with
178. See generally Student Loan Servicing All., 351 F. Supp. 3d at 46–76
(analyzing the D.C. law under the express, field, impossibility, and obstacle
preemption doctrines).
179. Perez, 457 F. Supp. 3d at 122.
180. Id. at 121 (quoting Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 399 (2012)).
181. Id. at 122.
182. Id. at 116.
183. Id. at 125.
184. Id. at 122. Unlike in Student Loan Servicing Alliance, the court here
invalidated the Connecticut licensing scheme as it applied to FDLP Loans only,
as the court’s evaluation of the underlying document request at issue in the
litigation did not require analysis of Connecticut’s licensing scheme as it
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Connecticut’s document request, as the authority upon which the
state based that request—that is, the licensing scheme—was
rendered null and void by the court’s preemption decision.185
Interestingly—and, for the purposes of this Comment,
troublingly—the court found the Connecticut law to be preempted
despite the strong presumption against preemption for state laws
that attempt to exercise the states’ traditional police power in the
area of consumer protection.186 According to the court, the relevant
cases seeking to protect federal government contractors from
exposure to state licensing schemes generally apply with equal
force even when those schemes are rooted in the honorable goal of
consumer protection.187 And, in finding the Connecticut law
preempted, Judge Shea noted that he “join[ed] the reasoning and
conclusion reached as to [the D.C. law] in a thorough opinion by
Judge Friedman.”188 The D.C. case, it seems, carried significant
weight with Judge Shea and may be similarly persuasive for other
members of the federal bench. But would it militate a similar
outcome if it were invoked in a challenge to SLBORA?
III. RHODE ISLAND’S SLBORA¾KEY DISTINCTIONS THAT SHOULD SAVE
THE STATUTE

In light of the decisions invalidating state-level student loan
servicer regulations in both the District of Columbia189 and
Connecticut,190 one might reasonably assume that the outlook for
SLBORA is rather bleak. However, the structure of SLBORA
differs from its counterparts in D.C. and Connecticut such that
SLBORA remains more likely to survive a court’s constitutional
scrutiny. This final Part will identify a few of the essential
applied to the other two loan categories. See id. However, as the reasoning
applied here mirrors that employed in Student Loan Servicing Alliance, one
can reasonably assume the Connecticut licensing scheme would suffer the
same fate as the D.C. law did when applied to Government-Owned FFELP
Loans. See Student Loan Servicing All. v. District of Columbia, 351 F. Supp.
3d 26, 75–76 (D.D.C. 2018). See also discussion supra Section II.A.5.a.
185. See Perez, 416 F. Supp. 3d at 129.
186. Id. at 122.
187. See id. at 125 (internal citations omitted).
188. Id. at 125 (citing Student Loan Servicing All., 351 F. Supp. 3d at 62).
189. See Student Loan Servicing All., 351 F. Supp. 3d at 75–76 (deeming
statute unconstitutional in part).
190. See Perez, 416 F. Supp. 3d at 125 (deeming statute unconstitutional).
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distinctions between SLBORA and other statutes of its kind and
will argue that these distinctions should be material enough to save
the statute from the fate that its out-of-state counterparts suffered.
A. SLBORA Does Not Involve a Servicer Licensing Scheme
First—and perhaps most importantly—unlike its counterparts
in D.C. and Connecticut, the foundational element of SLBORA does
not involve a servicer licensing scheme.191 Instead, SLBORA only
requires student loan servicers wishing to do business with Rhode
Island borrowers to register with the Rhode Island DBR.192
Further, although the statute requires prospective registrants to
complete an application for registration that the DBR promulgates,
it provides no authority for the DBR to review the financial
condition of student loan servicers as a precondition to approving
such an application.193 Moreover, aside from the requirement that
student loan servicers renew their registration annually, the DBR
is not authorized to revoke a previously approved registration.194
Those components are critical to SLBORA’s survival. Unlike
the licensing schemes that the D.C. and Connecticut statutes
created,195 SLBORA’s registration scheme does not authorize the
DBR to second-guess a servicer’s overall fitness for business in
Rhode Island.196 Without sanctioning or encouraging that type of
state-level second-guessing, SLBORA’s registration requirement
does not stand as an obstacle to a servicer fulfilling their
contractual duties with the federal government in the way that a
And, because the
discretionary licensing scheme would.197
registration process is far less intensive than seeking a license
would be, servicers should have no problem complying with federal
law, their contracts with the federal government, and SLBORA’s
191. Compare 19 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-33-4 (2020) (requiring servicer registration), with D.C. CODE §31-106.02 (2020) (requiring servicer licensure), and
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36a-847 (West, Westlaw through 2021 Reg. Sess.) (requiring servicer licensure).
192. 19 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-33-4 (2020).
193. See id. § 19-33-4(c)(1).
194. See generally id. § 19-33-4.
195. See discussion supra Section I.C.
196. See generally 19 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-33-4 (2020).
197. See generally Student Loan Servicing All. v. District of Columbia, 351
F. Supp. 3d 26, 63 (D.D.C. 2018) (discussing obstacle preemption).
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registration requirement.198 Put simply, a servicer would struggle
to make a successful impossibility preemption argument.199
So, because SLBORA’s registration requirement does not
interfere with the federal government’s contracting decisions, it is
likely that the Leslie Miller line of cases would not force a court to
render the registration system, or the statute generally, preempted
in its entirety under the obstacle preemption doctrine.200 As such,
a court would most likely not restrict SLBORA’s application to only
Commercial FFELP Loans.201 Importantly, the lack of such a
restriction would allow SLBORA to be fairly and constitutionally
applied to the servicing of ED’s entire student loan portfolio.202
However, a servicer could foreseeably raise the argument that
a registration requirement is simply a licensing scheme in disguise.
In fact, ED implicitly makes such an argument in its informal
guidance, where it groups licensing schemes and registration
requirements together in its blanket assertion that existing federal
law preempts state laws governing servicer conduct.203 Yet, despite
ED’s assertions, this argument is unlikely to succeed in court. As
previously noted, SLBORA’s registration requirement is far less
onerous than the D.C. or Connecticut licensing schemes were—
SLBORA does not provide the DBR with any authority to assess a
servicer’s fitness for business in Rhode Island before granting a
registration and does not allow the DBR to second-guess ED’s
decision to contract with any servicer seeking to do business in the
state.204 And, as Judge Friedman persuasively opined, ED’s
conclusory guidance deserves no judicial deference.205
Therefore, at least with respect to the core component of
SLBORA—its registration requirement—the statute appears to be
198. See id. at 60–61 (discussing impossibility preemption).
199. See id.
200. See id. at 63; see also Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Perez,
416 F. Supp. 3d 112, 125 (D. Conn. 2020).
201. See Student Loan Servicing All., 351 F. Supp. 3d at 72.
202. See id.
203. See Federal Preemption and State Regulation of the Department of
Education’s Federal Student Loan Programs and Federal Student Loan Servicers, 83 Fed. Reg. 10,619, 10,620 (Mar. 12, 2018).
204. See 19 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-33-4 (2020); see also Perez, 416 F. Supp. 3d
at 125; Student Loan Servicing All., 351 F. Supp. 3d at 63.
205. See Student Loan Servicing All., 351 F. Supp. 3d at 51.
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well positioned to survive a servicer’s foreseeable preemption
arguments.206
B. SLBORA’s Examination Provisions Do Not Derive from
Unconstitutional Authority
SLBORA’s registration requirement is just one of its many
components—equally important to SLBORA are its examination
provisions.207 Similar to the Banking Commissioner’s authority to
conduct examinations of servicers under the Connecticut statute,
which derived from the statute’s licensing scheme, SLBORA
authorizes the DBR to conduct examinations of all servicerregistrants in Rhode Island.208 Unlike the Connecticut or D.C.
statutes, however, the DBR’s examination authority does not
empower it to revoke or otherwise impact a servicer’s registration
as a result of such an examination.209 As noted in the preceding
section, this lack of revocation authority gives the DBR no power to
second-guess a servicer’s fitness for business in the state, and thus
significantly weakens a servicer’s prospective obstacle preemption
argument.210 So, assuming that the registration requirement
meets constitutional muster, a servicer could not reasonably argue
that the DBR’s examination authority derives from an
unconstitutional source.211
However, the examinations of servicer-registrants’ business
operations that the DBR can perform under SLBORA can be quite
comprehensive.212 Under SLBORA, the DBR is granted “free
access to the offices and places of business, books . . . records [and]
files” of all servicer-registrants in the state for examination
purposes and may conduct such examinations “as often as is
206. See 19 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-33-4 (2020); Student Loan Servicing All.,
351 F. Supp. 3d at 63.
207. See generally 19 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-33-9 (2020).
208. Compare 19 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-33-9 (2020), with CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 36a-851 (West, Westlaw through 2021 Reg. Sess.).
209. Compare 19 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-33-9 (2020), with CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 36a-851 (West, Westlaw through 2021 Reg. Sess.) and D.C. CODE § 31106.02 (2020).
210. See Student Loan Servicing All., 351 F. Supp. 3d at 63.
211. See Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Perez, 416 F. Supp. 3d 112,
122–29 (D. Conn. 2020).
212. See 19 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-33-9(c) (2020).
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necessary, based upon all relevant factors, including the volume of
[student loan servicing] activity within the state.”213
To the extent that SLBORA’s examination authority requires
servicers to provide documents to the DBR that may violate federal
law or their contracts with ED, a servicer may be able to level a
successful preemption argument against such document
requests.214 However, this limitation does not exclude all possible
document requests that the DBR could make of a servicer. So long
as the DBR’s document requests under SLBORA do not violate
federal law, or a servicer’s contract with ED, the statute can serve
its intended purpose without being deemed unconstitutional.215
C. SLBORA’s Prohibitions Should Survive, But Its
Responsibilities May Go Too Far
The last two of SLBORA’s main features are its enumerations
of prohibited servicer conduct216 and servicer responsibilities under
the act.217 The former of these two features appears generally safe
from constitutional scrutiny while the latter may not fare quite as
well under the frameworks discussed above and other pertinent
case law. This subsection will address each of these important
components in turn.
1.

SLBORA’s Prohibited Conduct Provisions

In accordance with its consumer protection spirit, SLBORA
outlines various types of conduct in which student loan servicers
must not engage while servicing Rhode Island borrowers’ loans.218
Specifically, SLBORA prevents servicers from “[d]irectly or
indirectly employ[ing] any scheme, device, or artifice to defraud or
mislead . . . borrowers,”219 and prohibits servicers from making
affirmative or negligent misrepresentations to borrowers

213. Id. §§ 19-33-9(c)–(d).
214. Perez, 416 F. Supp. 3d at 129.
215. See id. at 122–29; see also Student Loan Servicing All., 351 F. Supp. 3d
at 60–61.
216. 19 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-33-12 (2020).
217. Id. § 19-33-8.
218. See generally id. § 19-33-12.
219. Id. § 19-33-12(1).
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surrounding the repayment of their loans, among other noteworthy
prohibitions.220
These types of prohibitions within the statute represent an
exercise of Rhode Island’s state police power to protect its
consumers from businesses—in this case, student loan servicers—
that choose to employ errant conduct within the state.221 As a
general matter, when conducting a preemption analysis, “courts
should assume that the historic police powers of the States are not
superseded [by federal law] unless that was the clear and manifest
Thus, while some servicers have
purpose of Congress.”222
attempted to argue that these types of provisions fall within the
category of state regulation that § 1098g of the Higher Education
Act expressly preempts—that is, those which regulate servicerborrower communications—those arguments tend not to
succeed.223
In addition, recent cases tend to support the constitutionality
of the vast majority of SLBORA’s enumerations of prohibited
conduct, particularly those directed at misleading or otherwise
deceptive methods that servicers might attempt to employ when
servicing student loans in Rhode Island.224 And, of course, student
loan servicers can refrain from engaging in such conduct without
220. See id. § 19-33-12(2).
221. See Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Perez, 457 F. Supp. 3d 112,
121–22 (D. Conn. 2020) (noting that the presumption against preemption for
state laws “is particularly strong where . . . a state or locality seeks to exercise
its police powers to protect the health and safety of its citizens” (internal citation omitted)).
222. See id. (quoting Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 400 (2012)).
223. See, e.g., Nelson v. Great Lakes Educ. Loan Servs., Inc., 928 F.3d 639,
647 (7th Cir. 2019). In Nelson, the Seventh Circuit dealt with a servicer’s argument that a borrower’s affirmative misrepresentation claim, which the borrower brought under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business
Practices Act, ought to be preempted by § 1098g. See id. at 642. In finding
that § 1098g did not preempt such causes of action, the court expressly stated
that “Congress did not use language [in the express preemption provision
within § 1098g] that preempts all state-law consumer protections for student
loan borrowers when they are communicating with their loan servicers.” Id.
at 647. According to the court, that fact is especially true where the underlying
consumer protection claim deals with a servicer’s “voluntary but deceptive
statements,” as these types of voluntary affirmative misrepresentations are
not militated by any provision of the Higher Education Act. Id. at 649.
224. See id. at 647–49; Pennsylvania v. Navient Corp., 967 F.3d 273, 290
(3d Cir. 2020) (adopting distinction from Nelson).
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violating their contracts with ED, the Higher Education Act, or any
other relevant federal law, rendering any impossibility preemption
argument bloodless.225 To the extent that these prohibitions
attempt to regulate a servicer’s disclosures to Rhode Island
borrowers, however, SLBORA likely stands on far weaker
footing.226
2. SLBORA’s Servicer Responsibilities—Dancing on the Line of
Unconstitutionality
Unlike SLBORA’s prohibited conduct provisions, which can
find shelter from constitutional scrutiny in the manners just
described, the responsibilities that SLBORA assigns to servicers
operating within Rhode Island seem at least facially vulnerable to
express preemption under § 1098g of the Higher Education Act.227
Although rooted in the same consumer protection goal as the other
components of the statute, many of these provisions stand on weak
constitutional footing under the relevant case law.228
Unfortunately, many of SLBORA’s servicer responsibility
provisions attempt to regulate the disclosures that servicers make
to borrowers in the process of servicing their student loans.229 For
example, SLBORA requires servicers to provide borrowers, both
annually and upon request, the terms of the borrower’s loan, the
borrower’s progress towards repayment, and information about any
forgiveness programs for which the borrower might be eligible.230
SLBORA also requires servicers to disclose to the borrower the
financial impacts of that borrower’s potential choice to consolidate
or refinance his or her student loans.231
Though well-intentioned—and probably not too much of a
stretch under ED’s contracts with the servicers—the additional
225. See Student Loan Servicing All. v. District of Columbia, 351 F. Supp.
3d 26, 60–61 (D.D.C. 2018).
226. See Nelson, 928 F.3d at 650.
227. See id. (noting that “state consumer protection laws [that] impose additional disclosure requirements on loan servicers of federally insured student
loans. . . . would be preempted under § 1098g [of the Higher Education Act]”
(internal citation omitted)).
228. See id.
229. See generally 19 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-33-8 (2020).
230. See id. § 19-33-8(a).
231. See id. § 19-33-8(e).
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responsibilities that SLBORA thrusts upon student loan servicers
seem to fall directly within the Higher Education Act’s express
preemption provision, which invalidates state laws that regulate
servicer-borrower disclosures.232 While the state could argue that
these responsibilities are intended to prevent servicers from using
fraudulent or deceptive trade practices, the argument is a relatively
weak one given the use of the word “disclose” within the servicer
responsibilities provisions and the existence of a separate
delineation of prohibited conduct within the statute.233
Many of SLBORA’s other student loan servicer responsibilities
may also struggle to survive constitutional scrutiny for a different
reason—they encroach upon how servicers conduct their business
within the state.234 For example, SLBORA requires servicers to
develop and implement consistent procedures for helping borrowers
evaluate their loan repayment, consolidation, and refinancing
options.235 Further, “except as provided by federal law or required
by a student loan agreement,” SLBORA requires servicers to
“inquire of a borrower how to apply an overpayment” to the
borrower’s loan or loans.236
Again, standing alone, imposing these types of responsibilities
upon the student loan servicers seems almost honorable in light of
the alternative conduct they have proven capable of employing.237
Yet, state laws which strive to regulate how servicers conduct their
business within the state (as opposed to those regulating who may
operate as a servicer within the state) often stand as obstacles to
the objectives of federal law and ED’s contracts with its servicers.238
232. See Student Loan Servicing All. v. District of Columbia, 351 F. Supp.
3d 26, 53–54 (D.D.C. 2018) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1098g (2018)).
233. See Nelson, 928 F.3d at 650.
234. See Student Loan Servicing All., 351 F. Supp. 3d at 70 (citing Chae v.
SLM Corp., 593 F.3d 936, 947–50 (9th Cir. 2010).
235. 19 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 19-33-8(b)–(d) (2020).
236. Id. § 19-33-8(g). An overpayment occurs when a borrower pays more
than the amount due on his or her monthly statement. See, e.g., Rivera v.
Navient Solutions, No. 20-cv-1284 (LJL), 2020 WL 4895698, at *5 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 19, 2020). For an example of when a servicer’s misapplication of a borrower’s overpayments can go terribly awry, see id. at *3–5 and the Introduction
to this Comment.
237. See, e.g., Rivera, 2020 WL 4895698 at *3–5.
238. See Student Loan Servicing All., 351 F. Supp. 3d at 70 (citing Chae,
593 F.3d at 947–50).
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Thus, SLBORA’s servicer responsibility provisions may be
vulnerable to an obstacle preemption argument.239
Importantly, however, the Student Loan Servicing Alliance
court expressly noted that the Higher Education Act only requires
ED to establish minimum standards for servicer conduct.240 And,
as Congress did not intend to occupy the entire field of student loan
servicer regulation with the Higher Education Act and ED’s own
guidelines, SLBORA’s imposition of parallel or additional
responsibility requirements upon servicers in Rhode Island may not
run afoul of federal law.241 Provided the state can muster up a
compelling argument in this regard, those of SLBORA’s new
student loan servicer responsibilities that do not involve servicerborrower disclosures just might survive a servicer’s preemption
challenge.242
CONCLUSION

To summarize, SLBORA appears to be better positioned than
either of its invalidated counterparts to withstand a challenge from
a servicer on preemption grounds. Critically, SLBORA does not
center around a licensing scheme that empowers a Rhode Island
state agency to second-guess the federal government’s decisions to
contract with certain student loan servicers; SLBORA only requires
servicers to register annually with the DBR.243 Further, the state’s
ability to conduct examinations of servicer-registrants, though
wide-ranging, does not necessarily require servicers to violate the
Higher Education Act or its contracts with ED in order to comply
with the document requests that are likely to stem from such
examinations.244 And finally, while many of the disclosure
requirements within SLBORA may not be enforceable, the vast

239. See id. (citing Chae, 593 F.3d at 947–50).
240. See id. at 57.
241. See id. at 55–59 (discussing field preemption).
242. See id.; see also 19 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-33-12 (2020) (prohibited conduct
provisions).
243. Compare § 19-33-4 (registration scheme), with D.C. CODE § 31-106.02
(2020) (licensing scheme), and CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36a-847 (West,
Westlaw through 2021 Reg. Sess.) (licensing scheme); see also Student Loan
Servicing All., 351 F. Supp. 3d at 63.
244. See 19 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-33-9 (2020); see also Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Perez, 457 F. Supp. 3d 112, 123-225 (D. Conn. 2020).
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majority of the conduct that SLBORA prohibits falls within Rhode
Island’s traditional police power to protect its consumers from
commercial harm.245
Thus, while SLBORA may be similar to its out-of-state
counterparts in many ways, it remains fairly distinguishable from
those statutes in the manners described above such that the statute
can likely remain on the books as a constitutional consumer
protection measure and not just another “aspirational
document.”246

245. See 19 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 19-33-9, 19-33-12 (2020); see also Pa. Higher
Educ. Assistance Agency, 457 F. Supp. 3d at 121–22 (noting that the presumption against preemption for state laws “is particularly strong where . . . a state
or locality seeks to exercise its police powers to protect the health and safety of
its citizens” (internal citation omitted)).
246. See Student Loan Servicing All., 351 F. Supp. 3d at 52.

